When Diplomacy Fails Podcast

Episode 41: Adored No More examines the week following the shattering experience of Chinese intervention on a grand scale. With General MacArthur’s credibility in tatters, President Truman’s plan to apportion blame to his least favourite General now appeared to make all the more sense. MacArthur was under immense pressure to explain himself, and when he finally did, Truman’s response was to place a gag order on all US figures from talking about the country’s foreign policy. Truman claimed he was protecting the unity and integrity of Washington’s plans, but this was debateable. On the ground, amidst the schemes of the President and the desperate errors of the General, the men suffered. From late November until early spring, the soldiers were to experience a debilitating retreat in the worst wintery conditions seen in living memory. As all the practical difficulties blended in together, and as the talk in Washington continued, few could deny that the once triumphant General had taken a severe knock to his

Episode 40: Shock & Awe continues where we left off last time. This was the result of the Truman administration’s months of planning and theorising, and for the sake of NSC68 and the strategy of containment, it was believed to be the right one. The Chinese had finally intervened, and thus the efforts to make this so must have been considered a success. Yet, on the ground level, it was anything but a success, as the Chinese advanced with a ferocious pace and zeal that stunned and shattered all allied soldiers they encountered. With MacArthur apoplectic in Tokyo, it remained for the soldiers on the ground, let blindly into this mess by their vain commander, to pick up the slack. Instead, sense prevailed, and a massive retreat without parallel in American military history characterised the allies action in December of 1950. Several bloody and bitter battles were still to come with the Chinese, who blended their command with the North Koreans and fulfilled the total control of Pyongyang that Mao Zedong n

Truman continues to set up his General, as the allied soldiers wander into the consequences on the Manchurian border...Episode 39: ‘An Entirely New War’ focuses on that moment in the conflict when the Chinese finally pulled the trigger and invaded in massive force between late October and late November 1950. After months of diplomatic manoeuvring, Mao Zedong seemed to finally have had enough and believed that the moment had come to act in force. This decision, fully in line with the aims of the Truman administration, would destroy the plans of General MacArthur and reverse overnight the sense of superiority and positivity which had dominated his staff since the triumph at Inchon. As an episode it is a long one, but it is also a critical pivot of our story and contains too many vital threads to list here. Within we’ll see shattered dreams, fulfilled ambitions, distraught soldiers, zealous communists, hopeful North Koreans, confused subordinates, wasted resources, missed opportunities, unexpected bravery a

Truman serves up MacArthur, and contrary to popular imagination, it was not the General, but the President, who schemed in the background - at least at this stage...Episode 38: The Perfect Scapegoat introduces one of the most infamous aspects of the Korean War narrative to you guys – that insufferable tension between President and General which would eventually lead to the dismissal of the latter and harsh criticism of the former. It was a difficult relationship long before this plug was pulled though, and while we’ve seen disagreements and MacArthur’s reaction to the Truman administration’s policies vary, we take some time here to properly root a portion of our narrative in this perspective. More specifically, here we return to that meeting on Wake Island on 15th October between Truman and MacArthur, and we examine what I believe is the real reason why the President began to increasingly present himself alongside everyone’s favourite triumphant General. It wasn’t because he was in search of some of the glor

Since the founding of the United States, in every generation, in every field of business, politics, sports and society, we’ve watched in shock as corruption, deceit and desire bring down heroes, titans and those we thought we could trust.In the aftermath, we’re left with too many questions, how did this happen? Who is to blame?American Scandal, a new podcast from Wondery, will answer these questions. They tell the stories of America’s biggest scandals, the who, how and why, to discover what happened, how they changed our country - and what lessons we can learn.I encourage you to subscribe to American Scandal. The first story is a look inside America’s pastime - Baseball - and scandal that changed the way we view our favorite athletes. It’s riveting. And while you’re listening, subscribe to American Scandal on Apple Podcasts or wherever you listen to podcasts. Thanksss! Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Episode 37: Burning Chinese takes our story back a bit to late September, in roughly the same timeframe we covered in the last episode, to examine how the American policy was developed as the Chinese became ever more pressed to involve themselves. The official picture in Washington and among the UN allies, and of course in General MacArthur’s mind, was that no matter what they publicly said, the Chinese would not, could not intervene, and that thus, all evidence to the contrary was bluff or the intrigue of some communist agent. America’s leaders worked hard to reinforce this message, and it certainly likely that some heartily believed that there was no sense in stopping at the 38th parallel now that the North Koreans – the aggressors – were clearly in flight. Yet, it is inconceivable, as we’ve learned, that the Truman administration did not plan or think to plan for what may have occurred if Mao Zedong did decide to send his forces over the Yalu River. Indeed, if you believe my research, we have seen tha

Our biggest episode yet!Episode 36: Ordering Chinese picks up from the last episode, this time from the perspective of the Chinese, as in late September they were clearly faced with something of a quandary. Stalin was ramping up his campaign to urge the Chinese to intervene, and in response, the Chinese claimed that since Kim Il-sung had yet to ask for help, Beijing could not give it. Stalin thus set to work engineering his plan into motion, and ensuring that the North Koreans would indeed ask for help. It was only to be expected that as the military situation worsened for Pyongyang in light of the Inchon landings, that Kim would see sense and appeal to the communist comrade in Beijing. Indeed, it was likely that he would have no choice but to do otherwise, thanks to the Soviet unwillingness to aid the NKPA in its time of need. In case Soviet involvement in the war was discovered by the West, Stalin insisted, the Soviets would have to pull the plug of support for the Northern Army. These threats were del

Remember your NSC reports!NSC 68: The reason we're all here (ish).NSC 81: The public report on compromises that pleased everyone and meant nothing. Especially no mention of the Chinese...NSC 73: The secret report which imagined Chinese involvement.NSC 76: The report which confirmed that the Soviets would never get involved.Episode 35: Up In Flames examines that pivotal moment in the history of the Korean War, when General MacArthur finally got the chance to achieve his greatest triumph at Inchon. The build-up to this event and the circumstances which surrounded it were far from conventional as we have seen, since the war plans of the Soviets, Chinese and Americans all relied on MacArthur achieving a great success for their own reasons, yet the triumph at Inchon was an unmistakable victory for the grizzled General and his unflinching attitude towards the communists. Might, it seemed, had indeed made right.Under the surface of this great success, the political and strategic interests of Washington were still be

This is it history friends, our last free episode of section 2 of 1956! If you like what you hear here, then make sure and track down the rest. Hours of content await, not just associated with this series. If you want to invest in Zack Twamley, in history podcasting and in WDF's future, then supporting us on Patreon is the best way to do that. I'd be most grateful, and you'd be filled with more history audio than you can shake an Egyptian stick at! Head on over to our Patreon page and access all of 1956 for $5 a month by clicking here.Episode 2.2: Suez, A Life examines that critical actor in the Suez Crisis… No I’m not just talking about the British, I’m also talking about the Suez Canal! A French investment opportunity, an ancient idea, and a British masterstroke, discover in this episode how this waterway became so monumentally important for British imperial interests in the latter 19th century, and how this interest was then carried over into the 20th century. After years of defending and expanding their s

PATRONS! HISTORY FRIENDS! Everyone in between! Part 2 of 1956 is now upon us, and here’s what you should do.First – ask yourself, do you love history? Second – answer yes, and have a listen to us here, as we unpack the Suez Crisis, in 21 easy steps!For everyone, episodes 2.1 and 2.2 are out now, but for those Patrons at the $5 level and above, 1956 is about to get very interesting indeed! For the rest of the year we’ll be hitting you with the run up to, outbreak of and consequences of the SUEZ CRISIS. If you’ve been holding off from being a Patron up to now, then I can guarantee you that there has never been a better time to sign up. I think the last time we released a series so diplomatically juicy was…well…every time, but still, you’d be mad to miss out!So what’s in the box of Episode 2.1: Bitter French Pills? Well in order to get to the bottom of Suez, we must begin the story with one its main actors, and this is where the French come in. In this episode, we will examine the painful post-war experience of

After an interesting prelude, we are finally ready to tackle the main event of our series - the Suez Crisis. In this introductory episode, we explain what's in store, who to prepare for, what we're wary of and exactly why you should be excited for part 2 of this eventful series. Remember, the first two episodes will be out for FREE in line with getting everyone in the mood, but be sure to head over to our Patreon page to access all 20 of these episodes in full. For only a fiver a month, all of this and more could be yours.For those interested, make sure and track down the 1956 bibliography from the section of our website. Thankssss history friends, and stay tuned! Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

The fire by rank tactic used by Europeans in the 18th and 19th centuries had surprising beginnings, as we learn in this episode. While key military thinkers like Maurice of Nassau in the Netherlands played a pivotal role in changing how infantry were viewed and used on the battlefield, it is highly likely that he acquired inspiration for these ideas not just from Europe’s Ancient past, but also from Asian innovations many thousands of miles away.The adoption of the musket on a wide scale and its incorporation into the infantry-based armies of the 1500s was a process made into legend by the Spanish, who achieved their supremacy on the continent with the tercio formations – pikemen squares surrounded by musketmen, with a secure centre and the capacity to meet any challenge, be it man or beast, on the field. This tercio formation granted the Spanish stunning victories, from Pavia in 1525, all the way up to Nordlingen in 1634. Yet, as a tactic, it was gradually dying, to be replaced by Maurice of Nassau’s innovat

Episode 34: Building Inchon examines the extensive diplomatic and political preparation which the Truman administration engaged with in the weeks before MacArthur’s landing at Inchon on 15th September 1950. Truman was forced to deal with several issues, including the independently minded actions of some of his own personnel, like the Secretary of Defence, who would be forced to resign. We see a new policy report NSC 81 come to the fore, even while it didn’t promise a whole lot it still managed to please the British and French, which was its primary goal.Meanwhile, Mao and Stalin’s cynical approach to Kim Il-sung’s precarious position became clear as August became September. As Stalin’s support of North Korea slackened, the Soviet leader became focused instead with building towards his political strategy and end goal of bringing China into conflict with the West. Mao on the other hand was determined to wait until the landings at Inchon took place, landings which he almost certainly expected, so that it would b

Check out the Sound Education Podcast Conference at Harvard University, where you can meet yours truly and listen to some brilliant minds in podcasting over 2-3 November 2018!Episode 33: Chinese Chequers continues where we left off last time, as the implications of the American approach to Korea and Taiwan are heavily felt in Beijing. Mao now had reason to believe that the war could be turned to his advantage, and that a Chinese orientated Korean satellite on the sensitive border region was worth fighting for. It would also demonstrate the Chinese strength, and give Mao a chance to pose as a defender of communism, which was important for his reputation and self-image both at home and abroad. First, we examine a different but revealing new development in the United Nations, as India takes the lead in proposing a ceasefire arrangement. Predictably, this proposal failed, but it anticipated India’s later activism in the name of a Korean peace deal, and to some American figures, Chinese willingness to discuss

Episode 32: Chinese Whispers follows on from Truman’s speech requesting those yummy defence budget increases, by rolling our coverage back to the immediate aftermath of the American intentions to intervene which were announced on 26th June 1950. For Mao Zedong, our main focus for the next two episodes, the really aggravating aspect of Washington’s policy wasn’t that the Yanks were suddenly supporting Seoul with more enthusiasm – it was instead the fact that America now identified Taiwan as being part of this policy of support. They moved their fleet in between the Taiwan Straits, it was said, to prevent Chiang Kai-shek from intervening and breaking open the limited war, but Mao read between the lines, and believed that the act was done to interfere and jeopardise Chinese Communist interests, rather than protect the fragile Asian peace.Here we examine the Chinese leader’s fears and plans during the first half of 1950 and then his responses to the numerous challenges to the Chinese position immediately after th

Episode 31: Laying Down The Gauntlet looks at the other side of the coin and how the Americans reacted to the developing war in the late summer of 1950. MacArthur attempted to follow War Plan SL-17, which stipulated that a landing at Inchon should take place in response to a Northern surge down the peninsula, but problems existed in this plan, and MacArthur faced a conundrum throughout July 1950 as he tried to adapt to the curious nature of the communist advance. Pusan, it was clear, would be the holding action, and the test of allied mettle before reinforcements arrived. What was also clear in the Truman administration was that the time was right to present its first of many appeals to the public and to Congress. The policy aim of NSC 68 and the requirements within the defence budget necessitated that the President acted fast and did not hesitate to request, in consideration of the urgent state of affairs in Korea, some emergency funding increases. In addition, the apparently contradictory policy of app

We return with part 6 of our series on 17th century warfare, and in this episode we have something very special for you guys – an examination of the sick man of Europe, before he was sick, but when he was certainly maligned and looked down upon. For some time, it has been supposed that the Ottoman Empire could not keep pace with Western Europe, and that her eclipse by the West European powers in the 1700s was an inevitable, rational process which can be partially explained by the Turk’s reluctance to accept new technological advances. Yet, as we’ll learn here, this generalisation against the Turks is as unfair as it is unfounded. The Ottoman Empire possessed one of the most advanced organisational and administrative systems in the world at the dawn of the 17th century. She was equipped with some of the most educated military minds, and had on site some of the best facilities for producing the weapons of war which he soldiers needed. This was not a sick man of Europe, nor did the patient show any signs of

Episode 30: Unfriendly Fire switches gears from the Anglo-American to the Asian angle in the war. We encounter some more controversial points, as we learn just how instrumental Stalin was in blunting the force of the North Korean People's Army, as he manipulated the situation to acquire the war he wanted. Stalin was creating in Korea a war which would draw the allies in further, and which would force the Chinese to respond. With this in mind, he couldn't afford to watch the North actually push the allies off the peninsula and effectively win the war.In previous episodes, we've made the point that Stalin wanted a certain kind of war, but in my mind, this evidence here proves that Stalin was utterly committed to sabotaging Kim Il-sung after leading him to believe that the war would take a certain shape. Kim, much like the Chinese and Stalin believed, the Americans, were pawns in his game to gather greater power and influence for himself. We thus see for ourselves that the Northern failures were less to do with

Episode 29: With Allies Like These looks further at the Anglo-American relationship from where we left off last time. After July 1950, the British were militarily committed to Korea under the auspices of the United Nations, and under the command of General Douglas MacArthur. If these facts made Britons nervous, these nerves were not soothed by the repeated examples of where the two allies differed in their attitudes towards the theatre.The British were hesitant to invest too much resources in a region where they could construe little benefit, and they, unlike Washington, could not afford to anger the Chinese, whom they had recognised and wished to retain a favourable trading partnership with. These differences led to some stunning scenes, such as British intransigence in the United Nations General Assembly nearly forcing the British to vote on the side of the Soviets! These scenes and more come under our microscope here, as we examine the often fraught but desperately needed Anglo-American alliance as it trav

You can find American Moments here. It's a history podcast bringing you more of the history from America which you love, but may have forgotten...Episode 28: London Stalling, introduces us to the British participation in the Korean War, and how utterly transfixed on the American partnership Clement Atlee's administration was. A guiding reason why the British and their Commonwealth allies took part in the Korean War can be explained by the Anglo-American partnership, and the pressures felt in London to support Washington in Asia, even though their policies and interests frequently conflicted there.Several times, British and American allies butted heads over what to do in Korea, and the issue of how far to proceed once across the border and into North Korea was a very hot, sensitive topic as well. Once the Chinese intervened, the British felt all of their aims go up in smoke, and wished only to end the war as quickly as possible so that the defence of Western Europe could properly be organised. Rearmament, unli